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of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
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________________ 
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Before: AMBRO, VANASKIE, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: March 9, 2017) 
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OPINION  OF  THE  COURT 
________________ 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 Petitioner Jose Juan Chavez-Alvarez appears before us 
again, this time challenging a second decision of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) that he be removed, among 
other things, for committing sodomy while serving in the 
United States Army.  In the simplest of terms, the BIA 
reasoned that the President—through his delegated authority 
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to define punishments for those who commit military 
crimes—essentially could create the definition of those 
crimes himself.  He cannot, as the latter is a power reserved to 
Congress.  We therefore grant the petition for review and 
reverse the BIA’s decision. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
  Chavez-Alvarez is a citizen of Mexico.  He entered 
the United States without admission or parole but became a 
lawful permanent resident in 1989.  Following the adjustment 
of his status, he served in the United States Army for over 
twelve years.  
  
 While deployed to South Korea in August 2000, 
Chavez-Alvarez assaulted an intoxicated female platoon 
member by penetrating her vagina with his fingers and 
performing oral sex on her without consent.  When 
questioned about the incident by military officials, Chavez-
Alvarez denied the allegations against him on two separate 
occasions.  After formal charges were brought before a court-
martial, he entered into a stipulation of fact admitting the 
assault.  The military judge accordingly convicted him of 
violating three sections of the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice (the “Code”) as enacted at the time of his conviction: 
Article 107 (10 U.S.C. § 907) for making false official 
statements when he had earlier denied the allegations against 
him (two separate violations, one for each statement); Article 
125 (10 U.S.C. § 925) for sodomy; and Article 134 (10 
U.S.C. § 934) for adultery and indecent assault.  He was 
discharged and confined for 18 months.  
 
 Nearly a decade later, Chavez-Alvarez was detained 
by the Department of Homeland Security and charged as 
4 
 
removable because, under § 237, 8 U.S.C. §1227,1 of the 
Immigration and Naturalization Act (“INA”), he had been 
convicted of an aggravated felony with a term of 
imprisonment of at least one year, see 8 U.S.C. §§ 
1101(a)(43)(F), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), and two or more crimes 
involving moral turpitude not arising out of a single scheme 
of criminal misconduct, see 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii).  
The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) found him removable under 
both provisions of § 237 of the INA, determined he was 
ineligible for a waiver of inadmissibility under INA § 212(h), 
and ordered him removed to Mexico.  The BIA affirmed the 
IJ’s decision that Chavez-Alvarez was removable under 8 
U.S.C. §1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) because he committed the 
aggravated felony of forcible sodomy after his admission to 
the United States.  It held off determining whether he was 
also removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) 
(committing two separate crimes involving moral turpitude). 
 
 On appeal, we reversed the BIA because it incorrectly 
determined that Chavez-Alvarez’s sodomy conviction 
resulted in a term of imprisonment of one year or more.  
Chavez-Alvarez v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 783 F.3d 478 (3d Cir. 
2015).  Because there was no specific proof in the record 
“regarding the way in which the sentence was rendered as to 
each charge” by the military judge, it was impossible to 
determine whether the apportionment of the sentence as to his 
aggravated felony conviction was at least one year.  Id. at 
483-84.  Accordingly, we remanded to the BIA. 
 
 With the case back, it concluded that Chavez-Alvarez 
was nonetheless removable under the crimes-involving-
moral-turpitude provision of the INA.  He argued that he was 
                                              
 1 We refer interchangeably to the INA section and that 
in the U.S. Code.  
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only convicted of sodomy, a constitutionally protected 
activity under Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  The 
BIA disagreed, determining that because Chavez-Alvarez’s 
particular crime was subject to a sentence enhancement 
because it was committed forcibly, and because the 
application of the enhancement in his case was the 
“functional equivalent” of a conviction for the enhanced 
offense, he was convicted of forcible sodomy.  Finding that 
this was a crime involving moral turpitude, the BIA also 
determined that his two false-statements convictions were 
separate crimes of moral turpitude that were not within the 
same criminal scheme as that of his forcible sodomy 
conviction.  Hence the BIA found him removable, and he 
petitions us for review. 
II.  JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 We have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s final removal 
order under INA § 242(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).  Our 
jurisdiction here is limited to review whether there is a 
colorable constitutional claim or question of law.  Id.  We 
review legal questions de novo.  Valansi v. Ashcroft, 278 F.3d 
203, 207 (3d Cir. 2002).  “When the BIA issues its own 
decision on the merits, rather than a summary affirmance, we 
review its decision, not that of the IJ.”  Syblis v. Att’y Gen. of 
U.S., 763 F.3d 348, 352 (3d Cir. 2014) (quotations omitted).   
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
 On appeal, Chavez-Alvarez contends that his 
convictions arose from a “single scheme” of criminal 
misconduct and thus he is not subject to removal.  He also 
asserts that he was convicted of sodomy—not forcible 
sodomy—and the former is not a crime involving moral 
turpitude.  We address each issue in turn.  
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 A. The BIA’s Interpretation of a “Single   
  Scheme” Is Reasonable 
 Per 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), the Government may 
remove an alien who is convicted of “two or more crimes 
involving moral turpitude, not arising out of a single scheme 
of criminal misconduct,” after his admission to the United 
States.  Chavez-Alvarez claims that his two convictions of 
alleged crimes involving moral turpitude—his sodomy 
offense and making false statements—stem from the same 
scheme of criminal misconduct.  The rationale is that because 
only seven hours elapsed between the commissions of the two 
crimes and there is no evidence that he was not intoxicated 
throughout that time, Chavez-Alvarez had not yet dissociated 
himself from his single criminal enterprise when he made 
false statements following the assault. 
 
 The BIA deems a single scheme to exist “where one 
crime constituted a lesser offense of another, or where the two 
crimes flow from and are the natural consequence of a single 
act of criminal misconduct.”  Matter of Adetiba, 20 I. & N. 
Dec. 506, 509 (BIA 1992).  No single scheme exists simply 
because the acts may be the same, be similar in character, or 
even because one may closely follow the other.  Id.  At least 
five other Courts have affirmed this interpretation as 
reasonable and within the latitude the BIA possesses in 
interpreting the INA under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc., et al., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  
See, e.g., Balogun v. INS, 31 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 1994); 
Akindemowo v. INS, 61 F.3d 282 (4th Cir. 1995); Iredia v. 
INS, 981 F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1993); Abdelqadar v. Gonzales, 
413 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 2005); Thanh Huu Nguyen v. INS, 991 
F.2d 621 (10th Cir. 1993); see also Michel v. INS, 206 F.3d 
253 (2d Cir. 2000) (Cabranes, J., concurring);  Hyacinthe v. 
U.S. Att’y Gen., 215 F. App’x 856 (11th Cir. 2007).  All agree 
there is no clear definition of “single scheme” within the INA.  
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Thus there is a presumption that we defer to the agency’s 
interpretation of that phrase so long as it is reasonable.  See 
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844-45.  Indeed, that interpretation need 
not be the most reasonable.  Iredia, 981 F.2d at 849.  Finding 
no issue with the BIA’s construction of a “single scheme,” we 
join our fellow Courts in concluding that the BIA’s 
interpretation is reasonable.  
 
 Here the BIA ruled that, although the two crimes were 
committed hours apart, there was a substantial interruption of 
time between them.  It determined that making false 
statements with the intent to deceive was of such a different 
nature than sodomy that the former did not flow from nor was 
the natural consequence of the latter.  The BIA further noted 
that neither is a lesser crime of the other.  Given the lapse in 
time, Chavez-Alvarez had the opportunity to reflect on what 
he had done but chose—on two separate occasions—to make 
false statements denying his actions.  Thus the BIA was 
correct to affirm the IJ’s finding that Chavez-Alvarez’s 
alleged commission of two crimes involving moral turpitude 
was not from a single scheme of criminal misconduct. 
 B. Chavez-Alvarez’s Sodomy Conviction 
 At the heart of this appeal is whether the BIA correctly 
determined that Chavez-Alvarez’s sodomy conviction was 
one of moral turpitude, thereby making him removable under 
INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(ii).  The BIA concluded that the 
conviction was for forcible sodomy, which is akin to rape and 
therefore a crime involving moral turpitude.  Chavez-Alvarez 
challenges that ruling, insisting that he only was convicted of 
“sodomy” under the Code, as “forcible sodomy” appears 
nowhere in the statute that he violated.  (As will be discussed 
later, this distinction is important to Chavez-Alvarez’s 
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removability if “sodomy” is not a crime involving moral 
turpitude.)      
 
 The Government contends that, because the charging 
document accused Chavez-Alvarez of forcible sodomy 
(which was proven beyond a reasonable doubt by his 
stipulation of fact), this was the offense he committed.  And, 
the contention continues, when the crime of sodomy is 
committed forcibly, Article 125 of the Manual for Courts-
Martial (the “Manual”) allows the military judge to enhance 
the punishment imposed.  From this the Government asserts 
that the Manual (which lists various sentence enhancements 
based on the specific circumstances of sodomy convictions), 
when read as a complement to the Code, creates divisible 
crimes—here, consensual sodomy and forcible sodomy.  If 
so, we may look to Chavez-Alvarez’s specific conduct to 
determine which of these divisible crimes he committed, and 
thus bypass the controlling categorical approach that we 
would normally use in reviewing his claim.  See Partyka v. 
Att’y Gen. of U.S., 417 F.3d 408, 411 (3d. Cir. 2005).  We 
disagree.2 
 
 When determining whether a conviction becomes one 
of moral turpitude for the purposes of removal under the INA, 
we apply the categorical approach:  we “look to the elements 
of the statutory . . . offense, not to the specific facts 
[underlying the particular offense], reading the applicable 
                                              
 2 The Government requests that we remand this case to 
the BIA to determine if the Code and the Manual collectively 
create separate sodomy offenses, and thus whether the 
modified categorical approach should apply in light of Mathis 
v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016).  Because that is a 
legal question that we resolve, remand is unnecessary, and we 
deny the Government’s motion to remand.  
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statute to ascertain the least culpable conduct necessary to 
sustain conviction under the statute.”  Jean-Louis v. Att’y 
Gen. of U.S., 582 F.3d 462, 465-66 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc) 
(quotations omitted); see also Denis v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 633 
F.3d 201, 206 (3d Cir. 2011) (we are prohibited from 
“consideration of evidence other than the statutory definition 
of the offense, thus precluding review of the particular facts 
underlying a conviction.” (quotations omitted)).   
 
 However, when a statute “list[s] elements in the 
alternative, and thereby define[s] multiple crimes . . . [, a] 
sentencing court . . . requires a way of figuring out which of 
the alternative elements listed . . . was integral to the 
defendant’s conviction.”  Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2249.  It may 
in that case “look[] to a limited class of documents (for 
example, the indictment, jury instructions, or plea agreement 
and colloquy) to determine what crime, with what elements, a 
defendant was convicted . . . .”  Id.  A statute merely sets 
alternative means of satisfying a necessary element of the 
crime when it lists “illustrative examples” of that element; on 
the other hand, a statute creates separate (that is, divisible) 
crimes when it includes disjunctive elements (for example, a 
law that criminalizes both lawful and unlawful entry into 
another’s house with intent to steal, and the latter constitutes a 
more serious crime).  Id.  When a statute lists disjunctive 
elements, a court may conduct a limited review of the record 
to determine what conduct formed the basis of the conviction 
and therefore the crime committed.  
 
 Chavez-Alvarez pled guilty to violating the following 
Code provision as it existed in 20003: 
 
                                              
 3 The Code was later amended to criminalize only 
forcible sodomy.  10 U.S.C § 925(a). 
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(a) Any person subject to this chapter who 
engages in unnatural carnal copulation with 
another person of the same or opposite sex or 
with an animal is guilty of sodomy.  
Penetration, however slight, is sufficient to 
complete the offense. 
 
(b) Any person found guilty of sodomy shall be 
punished as a court-martial may direct. 
 
10 U.S.C § 925 (2000).  It did not distinguish between 
forcible or consensual sodomy.  What did distinguish types of 
sodomy was the Manual—guidelines promulgated by the 
President to courts-martial on how to impose punishments for 
various military crimes, including sentence enhancements 
based on how the crime was committed.  It provided that 
when “the act was done by force and without the consent of 
the other person,” the punishment may include a greater 
sentence of “[d]ishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay 
and allowances, and confinement for life.”  Manual (2000 
ed.), part IV, ¶ 51(b)(3) & (e)(1)).  The Manual thus 
authorizes a military judge to consider the facts underlying a 
crime to decide whether to enhance the sentence.   
 
 The Government insists that the Manual in conjunction 
with the Code creates separate sodomy offenses.  But can a 
sentencing consideration under the Manual become an 
element of the offense under the Code?  We think not, for we 
cannot consider “sentencing factors . . . in lieu of the 
unambiguous statutory language which speaks only in terms 
of the conviction.”  Roussos v. Menifee, 122 F.3d 159, 162 
(3d Cir. 1997) (citing Downey v. Crabtree, 100 F.3d 662, 668 
(9th Cir. 1997)).  The reason is obvious: sentence-enhancing 
factors do not define the crime; they affect the punishment of 
it.  Even the United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals 
interprets its own authorization to impose sentence 
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enhancements under the Manual in this way.  See United 
States v. Thomas, 45 M.J. 661, 664 n.4 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 
1997) (regarding the Manual’s sodomy sentence 
enhancements, “these are sentence-increasing circumstances, 
and not statutory elements . . . ”).  Thus, under the clear and 
unambiguous language of the sodomy statute contained in the 
Code as defined by Congress, Chavez-Alvarez was convicted 
of sodomy, not forcible sodomy. The BIA’s conclusion to the 
contrary is incorrect.4 
  
 Here, however, the BIA determined that “for 
immigration purposes a sentence enhancement can serve as 
the functional equivalent of an ‘element’ of an offense” so 
long as it (the sentencing factor) is proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  J.A. at 6.  It bases that authority from its 
own precedent.  See id. (citing Matter of Martinez-Zapata, 24 
I. & N. Dec. 424 (BIA 2007)).  That reasoning (and line of 
precedent) cannot stand, as it violates our constitutional 
doctrine of separation of powers between branches of the 
                                              
 4 Moreover, Mathis directs us to use the categorical 
approach not only because the underlying statute of 
conviction does not contain various elements that create 
separate crimes, but also because the INA makes removable 
an alien who “is convicted of two or more crimes” involving 
moral turpitude.  8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) (emphasis 
added).  We have explained that in Mathis the Supreme Court 
instructed that the “use of the phrase ‘conviction’ indicates 
Congress’s intent to apply the categorical approach.”  United 
States v. Dahl, 833 F.3d 345, 350 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing 
Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2252).  Thus we will not consider the 
facts underlying Chavez-Alvarez’s conviction (that it was 
committed forcibly) in deciding whether he committed a 
crime involving moral turpitude.  
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federal government.  It is black-letter law that “[t]he 
definition of the elements of a criminal offense is entrusted to 
the legislature, particularly in the case of federal crimes, 
which are solely creatures of statute.”  Dixon v. United States, 
548 U.S. 1, 7 (2006) (quoting Liparota v. United States, 471 
U.S. 419, 424 (1985)).  This means that “in a criminal case . . 
. the law must be written by Congress.”  United States v. 
Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 523 (2008) (citing United States v. 
Hudson, 11 U.S. 32 (1812)); see also United States v. 
Christie, 717 F.3d 1156, 1170 (10th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he 
Constitution generally assigns the job of specifying federal 
crimes . . . to the Legislative Branch.”).   
 
 The takeaway is that the Executive Branch, whether 
through the President or one of its agencies, cannot create 
criminal statutes; only Congress can do so.  The Manual, 
created by the President, is used by those in the Executive 
Branch to sentence military crimes.  The BIA, as an 
Executive Branch arm, determined that it can supplement—in 
reality, supplant—the Code to create separate, divisible 
crimes.  Not so.  The President certainly may define the terms 
of a punishment for one convicted of a military crime.  
Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 768 (1996) (“Congress 
[may] delegate authority to the President to define the 
aggravating factors that permit imposition of a statutory 
penalty . . . .”).  Yet his authority to do so is cabined by 
Congress’s definition of the relevant “criminal offense . . . 
within the field covered by the statute.”  Id. (quotation 
omitted).   
 
 The Government persists that the military justice 
system is unique and separate from our criminal justice 
system in federal court, and thus the same rules do not apply.  
No doubt “Congress has created and [the Supreme Court] has 
long recognized two systems of justice, to some extent 
parallel: one for civilians and one for military personnel.”  
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Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1983) (citation 
omitted).  But though military personnel are subject to a 
separate justice system with separate statutory rights and 
crimes, the Constitution is clear that Congress alone has the 
power to create that separate statutory regime.  See Weiss v. 
United States, 510 U.S. 163, 177 (1994) (“[T]he Constitution 
contemplates that Congress has plenary control over rights, 
duties, and responsibilities in the framework of the Military 
Establishment . . . .” (quotation omitted)); Schweiker v. 
Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 422-23, 436 (1988) (“Congress, in the 
exercise of its plenary constitutional authority over the 
military, has enacted statutes regulating military life . . . .” 
(quotation omitted)); Chappell, 462 U.S. at 304 (Congress is 
“the constitutionally authorized source of authority over the 
military system of justice”).  It does so through enactment of 
the Code.  The Manual is not a creature of Congress and thus 
cannot be used to displace the military justice system that 
Congress envisioned.  
 Accordingly, under Mathis it is impermissible to use a 
modified categorical approach to examine the facts 
warranting the application of a particular sentence-
enhancement factor when that factor was not an element of 
the statute of conviction.  Here the use of force in the 
commission of sodomy was not an element that Congress 
sought separately to criminalize at the time of Chavez-
Alvarez’s conviction.  Chavez-Alvarez therefore was 
convicted of sodomy, not forcible sodomy.                  
 
 C. The Code Definition of Sodomy Is Not a  
  Crime Involving Moral Turpitude 
 We now turn to the crime of which Chavez-Alvarez 
actually was convicted under the Code—sodomy—and 
whether it is a crime involving moral turpitude.  The Supreme 
Court requires us not to look behind the elements of a crime 
set out in a nondivisible statute, and here the applicable 
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version of the Code in 2000 did not distinguish between 
consensual and forcible sodomy (only the Manual did so and, 
as noted, that sentencing tool cannot add elements to the 
legislative definition of a crime).  Per Lawrence v. Texas, the 
“crime” in the Code affecting Chavez-Alvarez does not 
withstand constitutional scrutiny (hence the change to the 
Code provision long after the charge here).  He was convicted 
of sodomy, not forcible sodomy, and this cannot serve as a 
separate crime involving moral turpitude that makes him 
removable under the INA.   
 
*     *     *     *     * 
 
   In this context, the statute as written at the time of 
Chavez-Alvarez’s conviction cannot survive as a predicate 
“crime” that triggers the pertinent removability provision of 
the INA.  Thus we grant the petition for review and reverse 
the BIA’s holding that Chavez-Alvarez is removable under 
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii).   
  
